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ACADEMIC TENURE AND ACADEMIC
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RALPH S. BROWN* AND JORDAN E. KURLAND**
I
INTRODUCTION
Anyone with enough interest in academic tenure to glance at this article
knows what tenure is.
Are you sure? Here are two rather varying definitions. The first, by a
former president of Yale University, Kingman Brewster, is from the best brief
statement about tenure in a research university: "The practical fact in most
places, and the unexceptional rule at Yale, is that tenure is for all normal
purposes a guarantee of appointment until retirement age.", The second, by
Duke law professor William W. Van Alstyne, is found in the best general
defense of tenure: "Tenure, accurately and unequivocally defined, lays no
claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime employment. Rather, tenure
provides only that no person continuously retained as a full-time faculty
member beyond a specified lengthy period of probationary service may
thereafter be dismissed without adequate cause." 2
Both definitions are close to the truth: President Brewster's as a realistic
observation, Professor Van Alstyne's as a cautious scholar's synthesis. We will
have more to say about their apparent differences. The conventions and legal
status that both address affect all but a very few of the nation's accredited
universities and four-year colleges. 3 This article will say little or nothing
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1. Kingman Brewster, Jr., On Tenure, 58 AAUP Bull 381 (1972) (excerpted from his 1971-72
Report as President of Yale University).
2. William W. Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense, " 57 AAUP Bull 328
(1971) (emphasis in original). Further, Van Alstyne writes,
[i]t is but a limited statement that each faculty member possessing it, receiving it only after a
stipulated period of probationary service, is thought worthy of a rebuttable presumption of
professional excellence in continuing service to the institution. Thereafter, when
termination of his services is sought for any reason inconsistent with that presumption, it
requires only that the burden of justification be fairly discharged under conditions of
academic due process by those with whom it properly rests.
Id at 329.
3. Colleges with no tenure system are at some risk of winding up on the AAUP's list of
Censured Administrations (reprinted regularly in AAUP's Academe). A recent instance is Alvernia
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about two-year community colleges. While two-year institutions account for
almost 40 percent of post-secondary enrollments, 4 their practices range from
a tenure system following the higher education model, to the public school
model of granting tenure routinely after the teacher has served for two or
three years without running into difficulties, to no tenure system at all. 5
The conventions and entitlements of tenure have existed for generations.
Walter Metzger, in a comprehensive historical essay on academic tenure,
describes the judicial mode of controlling dismissals demonstrated by
university tribunals affording due process. 6 Metzger ascribes the recognition
of the judicial mode to the famous 1915 "philosophical birth cry''7 of the
American Association of University Professors ("AAUP"), the Declaration of
Principles of its Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.
That Declaration, in its "Practical Proposals," declared firmly that
[i]n every institution there should be an unequivocal understanding as to the term of
each appointment; and the tenure of professorships and associate professorships, and
of all positions above the grade of instructor after ten years of service, should be
permanent (subject to the provisions hereinafter given for removal upon charges). 8
The next major milestone in the development of tenure was the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.9 While the 1915
Declaration was the work of a committee of professors, the 1940 Statement
was a joint production of professors and university and college presidents.10
Endorsed by the Association of American Colleges ("AAC") (and over the
ensuing fifty years by more than 140 professional organizations),' I the 1940
Statement proclaimed that
[t]enure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) Freedom of teaching and research
and of extramural activities and (2) a sufficient degree of economic security to make
the profession attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom and economic
security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success of an institution in fulfilling its
obligations to its students and to society.
12
College (Pennsylvania), the subject of a report in 76 Academe 67 (January-February 1990), and
censured in June 1990.
4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 153 (110th ed 1990).
5. In 1987, 62% of public two-year colleges had a tenure system, compared to 99% of four-
year public institutions, according to a 1988 U.S. Department of Education survey reported in
Carolyn J. Mooney, New U.S. Survey Assembles a Statistical Portrait of the American Professoriate, Chron
Higher Educ A15, A19 (February 7, 1990).
6. Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in Commission on Academic
Tenure in Higher Education, Faculty Tenure 93 (Jossey-Bass, 1973) ("Academic Tenure"). The
pioneering work on tenure practices and law is Clark Byse & Louis Joughin, Tenure in American Higher
Education: Plans, Practices, and the Law (Cornell Univ Press, 1959).
7. Metzger, Academic Tenure at 148 (cited in note 6).
8. General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1 AAUP Bull 17, 40- 41
(1915) (" 1915 Declaration"); see Appendix A, 53 L & Contemp Probs 393, 405-06 (Summer 1990).
9. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure ("1940 Statement"), in Policy
Documents and Reports 3 (AAUP, 1984) ("1984 AAUP Red Book"); see Appendix B, 53 L & Contemp
Probs 407 (Summer 1990).
10. See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 3 (Summer 1990).
11. There was an intermediate "Conference Report" of 1925, not germane to this survey. For
the most recent list of endorsers of the 1940 Statement, see AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports 3
(AAUP, 1990) ("1990 AAUP Redbook").
12. 1940 Statement at 3; Appendix B at 407 (cited in note 9).
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Here one finds a second emphasis-on economic security-and, further on in
the Statement, a refinement of procedural protections, along with a
shortening of the allowable probationary period to seven years.
The 1940 Statement marks the maturity of the linkage of academic tenure
to academic freedom. The Statement-incorporated, often verbatim, in the
policies of hundreds of colleges and universities-is the yardstick for
measuring adherence to proper standards of academic freedom and tenure.13
Although many would limit academic freedom, some very seriously, hardly
anyone nowadays attacks it head on. But academic tenure is always under
attack. Usually we hear only grumbling and rumbling, as of distant artillery.
But occasionally there is a prolonged fire-fight. The last such episode flared
up in the early 1970s, when the long postwar expansion of higher education
slowed. Jobs became scarce. Many institutions that had been lavish in
conferring tenure proclaimed themselves "overtenured."' 4  Much of the
disputation upon which this paper relies comes from that decade.' 5 Now, in
1990, the pendulum may have swung. Those hired to teach the baby-boomers
are approaching retirement. We are told that there will be more jobs.16 Yet
dissatisfaction still surfaces. 17 It is noteworthy that proponents of tenure are
perennially on the defensive; recall the title of Van Alstyne's article, Tenure: A
Summary, Explanation, and "Defense. "18 The attacks tend to be hit-and-run;' 9
the defensive statements are more sustained.20
13. "Probably because it was formulated by both administrators and professors, all of the
secondary authorities seem to agree that it is the 'most widely-accepted academic definition of
tenure'." Krotkoffv Goucher College, 585 F2d 675, 679 (4th Cir 1978) (citations omitted). See generally
Note, The Role of Academic Freedom in Defining the Faculty Employment Contract, 31 Case W Res L Rev 608
(1981) (authored by Richard H. Miller); Ralph S. Brown & Matthew W. Finkin, The Usefulness of AA UP
Policy Statements, 59 Educ Record 30 (1978).
14. See Fred M. Hechinger, Job Crunch Spurs Debate on Tenure, New York Times § 3 at 5 col 4
(January 16, 1979). After noting the "huge expansion" of the 1950s and 1960s, and the attendant
"crippling shortage of teachers," Hechinger writes that "[flaculty members were hired ... with a
diminishing concern for their true, lasting capacities. Often, they were given tenure after less than
complete scrutiny. Such profligate uses of tenure did much to bring it into disrepute." Id.
15. See also Malcolm G. Scully, Attacks on Tenure Mount; Limitations are Proposed in 5 States, Chron
Higher Educ 1 (March 22, 1971) ("Attacks on Tenure Mount").
16. See William G. Bowen & Julie Ann Sosa, Prospects for Faculty in the Arts and Sciences: A Study of
Factors Affecting Demand and Supply, 1987-2012 134-35, 142-43 (Princeton Univ Press, 1989). Carolyn
J. Mooney, Uncertainty is Rampant as Colleges Begin to Brace for Faculty Shortages Expected to Begin in 1990s,
Chron Higher Educ A14 (January 25, 1989).
17. See, for example, Page Smith, Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America 114-22 (Viking
Press, 1990) ("Killing the Spirit").
18. See note 2.
19. A recent instance is a short editorial piece, The Tenure Temptation: Don't Give Professors Lifetime
Jobs, 302 The Economist 15 (February 28, 1987).
20. In the last 20 years, there has been an impressive array of statements that, on balance,
support academic tenure. A varied collection of essays-some critical-is Bardwell L. Smith &
Associates, eds, The Tenure Debate (Jossey-Bass, 1973). In the same year appeared Faculty Tenure (cited
in note 6), the report of an independent Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education
sponsored by the AAC and the AAUP, and funded by the Ford Foundation. Two university
committees produced substantial reports that, even though they reflect the acute tensions of their
times, have continuing interest: University of Utah Commission to Study Tenure, 57 AAUP Bull 421
(1971); Academic Tenure at Harvard University, 58 AAUP Bull 62 (1972). See also Fritz Machlup, In
Defense of Academic Tenure, 50 AAUP Bull 112, 118 (1964). A recent temperate appraisal is Henry
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Although this paper will accentuate the affirmative, it too will unavoidably
take a counter-attacking posture. Part II will address briefly the heart of the
matter: does academic tenure reinforce academic freedom? Of course it
does. We will then consider in Part III the asserted costs of tenure and the
reasons behind the chronic criticism. Part IV, accepting the significant
economic and social costs of tenure, will describe other substantial advantages
of the practice, beyond the direct safeguarding of academic freedom. We will
then ask in Part V whether alternative devices would effectively protect
academic freedom--devices such as legal defenses, internal safeguards, less-
than-career tenure, or tenure reviews-and conclude that they would not.
Part VI examines leaks in the dike of conventional tenure: due process
deficiencies; the extent to which tenure may be undermined by financial
exigency claims or by discontinuing entire programs; and the unease
occasioned by the coming demise of mandatory retirement. Part VII turns to
the plight of the untenured. What protects their academic freedom?
II
ACADEMIC TENURE AS THE PRIMARY DEFENSE OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
The conferral of tenure makes it very difficult thereafter to dismiss a
professor for views expressed in the classroom, in scholarly writing, or in
public arenas. 21 As Van Alstyne's definition emphasizes, the university has
the burden of demonstrating that the faculty member has said or done things
offensive enough to warrant dismissal. But there is more involved than
burden of proof. What constitutes adequate cause for dismissal? Some
university regulations provide laundry lists of potential offenses, but more are
silent on the matter. A fairly standard formulation would resemble the
recommendation of the 1973 Commission on Academic Tenure, that
"'adequate cause' in faculty dismissal proceedings should be restricted to (a)
demonstrated incompetence or dishonesty in teaching or research, (b)
substantial and manifest neglect of duty, and (c) personal conduct which
substantially impairs the individual's fulfillment of his institutional
responsibilities." 22
There seems to be little room here for seizing on heterodox or unpopular
views as a ground for dismissal or for any lesser sanction. It would be
possible to argue in extreme cases that a scholar who published wildly was
incompetent; but we know of no such recent actual cases (as distinct from
general allegations of incompetence found in hostile criticisms of tenure).
Rosovsky, The University: An Owner's Manual 117-87, 189-212 (W. W. Norton, 1990) ("The
University").
21. The important study, Howard R. Bowen & Jack H. Schuster, American Professors: A National
Resource Imperiled 235-44 (Oxford Univ Press, 1986) ("American Professors"), in a significant passage
supporting tenure, but decrying certain rigidities in "present rules and practices," id at 244, declares
that the procedures for ridding the profession of misfits are so arduous and embarrassing that they
take on the flavor of a trial for murder, id at 243.
22. Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education, Faculty Tenure at 75 (cited in note 6).
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The word "dishonesty" can, of course, be twisted to fit an accusation that the
scholar who advances unpopular beliefs must not honestly believe what he
professes. Communists, in the McCarthy era, were so stigmatized. 23 An
institution might also attempt to proscribe by regulation certain teaching or
writing, and then charge anyone who defied the ban with insubordination.
The only sector of higher education where one can find avowed denials of
academic freedom is occupied by religiously controlled institutions that
impose limitations they consider essential to the purity of their faith. Such
limitations were tolerated by the 1940 Statement. In 1970 a set of
interpretations formulated by the AAC and the AAUP asserted, perhaps
prematurely, that "[m]ost church-related institutions no longer need or desire
the departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940
Statement, and we do not now endorse such a departure." 24 The interpreters
did not foresee the recrudescence of Protestant and Moslem
fundamentalisms, and the constraints on dissent imposed on Roman Catholic
scholars in recent years. 25 These religious limitations on academic freedom
are dealt with elsewhere in this symposium 2 6 and need not be elaborated
here.
We return to the central issue of this article: does academic tenure
reinforce academic freedom? As we have already asserted, of course it does.
Allowing always for the human capacity to evade and distort punitive
measures, and for the tendency of any system to become leaky under heavy
pressures, a system that makes it difficult to penalize a speaker does indeed
underwrite the speaker's freedom. 27
Before going on to inquire whether tenure performs its intended function
at too great a cost, let us offer a rapid look at the academic freedom scene as it
appeared early in the century, in contrast to the seeming security that prevails
toward the end of 1990. One has only to peruse the still standard work of
1955, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States, by Richard
Hofstadter and Walter Metzger,2 8 or other histories of higher education, to be
reminded that, before 1915, respected university presidents and boards of
23. See Sidney Hook, Should Communists be Permitted to Teach?, New York Times Magazine 7
(February 27, 1949). For rebuttal, compare Fritz Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic
Freedom, 41 AAUP Bull 753 (1955).
24. 1990 AAUP Red Book at 6 (cited in note 11).
25. See Report: Academic Freedom and Tenure: Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (North
Carolina), 75 Academe 35 (May-June 1989); Concordia Theological Seminary (Indiana), 75 Academe 57
(May-June 1989); Catholic University of America, 75 Academe 27 (September-October 1989).
26. Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities, 53 L & Contemp
Probs 303 (Summer 1990).
27. Without suppressing the status of the speaker, it is of course possible to infringe academic
freedom by suppressing specific speech. Works of art, either dramatic or visual, are especially
vulnerable to this kind of denial of freedom. See Robert M. O'Neil, Artistic Freedom and Academic
Freedom, 53 L & Contemp Probs 177 (Summer 1990); Paul Strohm, Academic Freedom and Artistic
Expression, 76 Academe 7 (July-August 1990); Paul Strohm, Statement on Academic Freedom and Artistic
Expression, 76 Academe 13 (July-August 1990). Such denials, however, ordinarily do not impinge on
tenure.
28. Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United
States 420-21 (Columbia Univ Press, 1955).
Page 325: Summer 1990]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
trustees had little hesitation in firing senior professors who took positions on
great issues of the day contrary to the conventional wisdom. Indeed,
presidents themselves were not immune.29 Immediately after the seminal
1915 Declaration, our entry into World War I extinguished academic freedom
for critics of the war; the AAUP itself joined in condoning dismissals for
wartime disloyalty.3 0 Tenure, even if nominally recognized, apparently
provided little protection.
For an oblique snapshot of the near impregnability that tenure has
attained by 1990, we adduce as evidence two fierce books published in that
year. Both are sharply critical of the damage that their authors think
influential faculty are wreaking on higher education. Both conclude, though
they do not accept, that nothing can be done to repress the malignants.
Page Smith, a prolific popular historian who fled academe in 1974,
published a wide-ranging polemic, Killing the Spirit.3' Smith believes that
higher education has gone so desperately astray from the ideals of the
American Enlightenment, which flourished in a golden age at Johns Hopkins
University roughly a century ago,3 2 that it is now dominated by presentism,
excessive specialization, relativism, and giantism.33 He considers the greatest
evils of the system to include the dominance of the Ph.D. and the institution
of tenure.3 4 Repeatedly he blames tenured faculty for what he considers the
current perversions of the humanities,3 5 the social sciences,3 6 and the
curriculum,3 7 reserving special disdain for women's studies.38 In the end, he
can only ask, "Can a more humane and sensible system of tenure be worked
out? Or should the whole system be abandoned?" 39 The other recent
polemic, Tenured Radicals, by Roger Kimball, 40 is thinner and shriller than
Killing the Spirit.4 1 It concentrates on the invasion of academic letters by
women's studies, black studies, gay studies, deconstruction, poststructuralism,
and so on. 4 2 Kimball dislikes everything he sees. The only reference to
tenure is in the title; it is apparently significant to Kimball that the radicals
pushing these abominations are tenured. The point for our purposes is that
both authors seem to accept that their enemies are immovable. Tenure does
29. Id.
30. Id at 504.
31. Smith, Killing the Spirit (cited in note 17).
32. Id at 54-55.
33. Id at 294.
34. Id at 108ff.
35. Id at 253ff.
36. Id at 223ff.
37. Id at 140ff.
38. Id at 285ff.
39. Id at 304.
40. Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education (Harper &
Row, 1990) ("Tenured Radicals").
41. Smith, Killing the Spirit (cited in note 17).
42. Kimball, Tenured Radicals at xi-xviii (cited in note 40).
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protect academic freedom, even when that freedom is accused of being put to
bad purposes. 43
III
THE COSTS OF TENURE
Quite aside from the possibility that the wrong people may have tenure,
the conferral of tenure certainly entails costs-for the institution, for the
recipient, and for society. For the institution, the first cost is the long-term
financial commitment. If we assume a thirty-five year duration of tenure until
a normal retirement age, with annual compensation starting at $40,000 (and
sure to increase with time and inflation), the employing institution incurs a
commitment that will doubtless reach two million dollars.
The second and more troubling cost (one that will be borne, directly or
indirectly, by all the participants) arises from the risk that the tenure decision
will turn out to have been unwise. The teacher may not teach well; the scholar
may not publish; the university may have acquired a poor citizen. All these
shortfalls are expectable, in every possible combination. Note that these risks
are present despite the long probationary period. If the full seven year period
allowed by the 1940 Statement is taken (or even an extra two or three years in
certain prestigious and cautious universities), the candidate will have been
thoroughly scrutinized and appraised. Because of the magnitude of the
commitment, anxious judgment will have been applied, surely by the
administration, even if the candidate's department is careless, or overeager to
retain a colleague. There are few counterparts to this long apprenticeship,
which, one should remember, commences only when the teacher has
completed or almost completed his formal schooling. The medical
postdoctoral ordeal of internship and residency can stretch almost as long.
The time to make (or not make) partner in a large law firm is also comparable.
Contrast the attainment of civil service tenure by a bureaucrat, a police officer,
or a teacher. That process will rarely require more than three years.
Thus, the decision-makers will have made every effort to satisfy themselves
of a candidate's worth; but their judgments may turn out to have been
misjudgments. If so, we will eventually confront the universal cliche-that the
university is spotted, or even riddled, with deadwood.
Why this particular metaphor? After all, as Metzger has tartly observed,
the university is not a lumber warehouse. 44 One would welcome a
lexicographer's search to learn how it started. Without waiting for that
enterprise, we must confront the denigration.
Perhaps the prevalence of deadwood is assumed because of the conceded
difficulty of removing a tenured professor. It is also difficult to remove a
laggard civil servant, and complaints about the efficiency of the government's
43. The authors take no position on the validity of the indictments brought by Smith and
Kimball. Their works are relevant for us only as testimonies to the strength of tenure.
44. Metzger, Academic Tenure at 159 (cited in note 6).
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many branches are not unfamiliar. But the contemplation of faculty
deadwood seems to arouse special emotions. Is this because the claims for
academic tenure, and our concern with protecting academic freedom, are
viewed as overblown? After all, how many tenured faculty members face
threats to their freedom during their careers? There is no evidence that many
of those tenured have more than fleeting brushes with hostile authorities, be
they colleagues, administrators, or outsiders who are in positions of power.
The usual rejoinder to this observation is that all must be protected for the
sake of the occasional heretic from whose heresies we learn something. Who
in academic life is going to make dangerous contributions to learning? There
is no way to know in advance. Therefore everyone, the timeserver as well as
the prophetic genius, should have the opportunity to qualify for the shelter of
tenure. Unsettling genius may bloom late.
All the handwringing over deadwood is itself remarkably devoid of
anything resembling data about the extent of the blight. The present writers
have been paying attention for thirty years to controversies about the value of
tenure; they cannot recall ever seeing anything resembling a statistic. In fact,
the only numerical estimate that they can summon is from Dean Rosovsky's
genial appraisal of tenure, based chiefly on his long experience at Harvard.
He opines that "the label deadwood would apply only to under 2 percent of a
major university faculty; that is my totally unscientific conclusion." 45 If that is
a plausible guess, how many more could be labelled deadwood at universities
and four-year colleges that make less demanding requirements for tenure?
Might we guess 5 percent? The issue whether any small number, 2 percent or
5 percent, justifies undoing the tenure system leads to further questions.
What is the deadwood index for comparable sectors of the workforce? What
sectors are comparable? Do these sectors have de facto tenure, in that, after a
certain period of employment, stability is expected and achieved? Is the
detriment to society from the existence of unpruned deadwood among civil
servants, accountants, bankers, or lawyers (to pick examples almost at
random) more or less severe than the harm caused by sloth among tenured
academics? 46 Such questions are rarely asked, let alone answered. It would
be so difficult to make effective inquiries that their absence is understandable.
Thus far we have established two conclusions. First, tenure does
safeguard academic freedom. Second, it does so at a cost, in the occasional
case when a tenured scholar becomes deadwood, yet does not function so
poorly as to warrant removal. The academic enterprise in that case is not
getting its money's worth, especially when deserving candidates are available
for the poorly filled position. It is perhaps comforting to think that in the
absence of a tenure system, substandard performers would be more easily
separated. But there is surely a countervailing costly risk that, without the up-
45. Rosovsky, The University at 210-11 (cited in note 20).
46. An engaging impressionistic survey of the prevalence of de facto tenure in many walks of life
is to be found in John R. Silber, Tenure in Context, in Bardwell L. Smith & Associates, eds, The Tenure
Debate at 34-42 (cited in note 20).
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or-out decision that is crucial to conferring or denying tenure, marginal
performers would simply be allowed to linger on and on until retirement.
There is yet another cost, which is imposed upon scholars who do become
tenured. Tenured stability is conventionally supported as a tradeoff for the
lower salaries paid to faculty members, compared to other highly trained
professionals. But as Fritz Machlup showed in a pioneering examination of
tenure as viewed by an economist, those lower salaries should also be viewed
as a cost.47 Without tenure, the uncertainty of employment would require
higher salaries.
IV
OTHER GAINS FROM TENURE THAT OFFSET THE COSTS
Conceding social and economic loss from those who attain tenure and
then perform submarginally, are there other offsetting gains from the
practice?
We have already mentioned economic security; tenured faculty members
accept low wages in return for appointment until retirement. The emphasis
on security in the 1940 Statement ("Freedom and economic security, hence
tenure, are indispensable .... .") represents, according to Metzger, a
"routinization of job security that might have been picked up from Civil
Service situations." 48 One might guess that the experience of the Great
Depression, not entirely dispelled, might also have influenced the drafters of
1940. If the AAUP were writing the 1940 Statement in 1990, we doubt that
economic security would be given parity with academic freedom as the raison
d'etre of tenure. Faculty salaries, we suggest, should be equivalent to average
earnings in comparable professions. This seems a more worthy goal than
keeping academics one step ahead of shabby gentility.
However, long-term employment stability represents an important benefit
of tenure, quite aside from the assurance of a salary. The assurance that one
can get on with one's work without much interference, that one has status in a
company of learned men and women, that one can grow old without fearing
the axe of age discrimination (now illegal but surely still wielded)-all these
are advantages of tenure. They are what Rosovsky aptly calls "tenure as social
contract." 49 The social contract aspects of tenure must also create a favorable
climate for academic freedom (except when the contract is broken, and
colleagues become enemies). Similarly, the extended duration of a tenured
47. Machlup, 50 AAUP Bull at 118 (cited in note 20).
48. Metzger, Academic Tenure at 152 (cited in note 6).
49. Rosovsky, The University at 183 (cited in note 20). A similar view is well expressed by Bowen
and Schuster. They write that tenure
is conducive to collegiality. A college or university to be maximally effective must be a
community to which people belong and which they care about .... Such collegiality is not
created instantly or spontaneously. It is developed over time through the presence of
committed faculties. Tenure is a powerful tool for enlisting that commitment.
Bowen & Schuster, American Professors at 236-37 (cited in note 21).
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appointment aids academic freedom in that it makes possible commitments to
very long-term projects. 50
Leaving academic freedom considerations aside, McPherson and Winston
show in a valuable paper that "[t]he tenure institution has some desirable
efficiency properties that are often overlooked." 5' Stable employment, they
point out, promotes efficiency by diminishing uncertainty. Academic
employment differs from business employment in that the corporation is free
to move people around and shift their fields. On the other hand, faculty
members are trained to rather intense specialization. Their capacities can be
measured only by their professional peers. Once that has been done during
the long probationary period, and the tenure decision has been reached,
further continuous monitoring is usually unnecessary. Such monitoring takes
up very heavy resources in business enterprises. It would be especially costly
for academic institutions if attempted by inexpert central administrations.
Because of their own tenure, the senior professors who in practice make the
tenure decision are not threatened by bringing on able colleagues. This fact
helps to maintain quality. Indeed, a cynical-seeming paper by Lorne
Carmichael argues that tenure is essential to prevent declines in quality.
"Loosely, tenure is necessary because without it incumbents would never be
willing to hire people who might turn out to be better than themselves,"
Carmichael asserts.52
Still another variant on the economic arguments describes the university
as a principal in a frequent business pattern called "hands-tying." In dealing
with promising researchers, the university induces them with tenure. That is,
the university ties its hands so that it cannot renege just because a particular
appointment does not pan out. If it selects shrewdly, it will, on balance, gain,
and able scholars will sign on because of the tenure commitment. 53
Since much of the opposition to tenure decries its supposed inefficiency
(because of the deadwood risk), it is reassuring to have economists,
habituated as they are to following through all the implications of a problem,
emerging with efficiency rationales for tenure. Of course, none of the
arguments we have advanced is amenable to quantification. We have pointed
out familiar, indeed obvious, reasons why tenure supports academic freedom.
We have conceded that tenure does impose some costs on society,
universities, and teachers, while arguing that deadwood costs are unknown
and probably exaggerated. We then described benefits of tenure independent
of the central theme of academic freedom. The reader must strike her own
balance.
50. Brewster, 58 AAUP Bull at 382 (cited in note 1).
51. Michael McPherson & Gordon C. Winston, The Economics of Academic Tenure: A Relational
Perspective, 4J Econ Behavior & Org 163 (1983).
52. H. Lorne Carmichael, Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?, 96 J Pol Econ 453, 454
(1988).
53. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Hands-Tying in Principal-Agent Relationships:
Venture Capital Financing, Publishing Contracts, and Academic Tenure 26 (December 1989)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
[Vol. 53: No. 3
ACADEMIC TENURE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
V
ALTERNATIVES TO TENURE
Critics propose four possible alternatives to tenure, all of which are
advocated as safeguarding academic freedom. The first alternative advanced
is that of legal tribunals, affording both procedural and substantive due
process; supporters argue these protections would make conventional tenure
unnecessary. The second, related to the first, would rely on internal
university tribunals. The third and fourth, almost interchangeable in their
advantages and disadvantages, are "term tenure'"-successive term
appointments, of five years or more, until retirement-and "interruptible
tenure"-periodic formal review that can lead to a termination of tenure.
A. Reliance on the Law
The disputants who blithely declare that academics do not need tenure
because the courts will protect academic freedom are not relying on close
analysis of the relevant case law. 54 The first and fourteenth amendments do
offer some aid to injured professors; but the scope of protection is hardly
sufficient to supplant the safeguards of contractual or statutory tenure.
Although several ringing affirmations of academic freedom have emanated
from the Supreme Court, it is still uncertain what that Court would do in a
straightforward case in which an untenured professor has been disciplined for
the content of classroom utterances or scholarly writing. A first obstacle
arises from the proposition that the academic freedom extolled by the Court
is that of the institution, not of individual faculty members. 55 The terrain is
too extensive to be retravelled here.56 Consider only Justice Frankfurter's
famous dictum in his concurrence to Sweezy v. New Hampshire,57 where he
quoted South African academics on "[t]he four essential freedoms of a
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 58
54. See James O'Toole, Tenure: A Conscientious Objection, Change 24, 29 (June-July 1978). This
article is a relatively sustained denunciation and renunciation (by its author) of tenure. It was
responded to by William W. Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Conscientious Objective, 10 Change 44 (October
1978); compare the remark of an unnamed "official of an educational institution" in Malcolm G.
Scully, Attacks on Tenure Mount at 15 (cited in note 15): "As I see it, academic freedom is just another
phrase for constitutional rights, properly understood."
55. This thesis is well developed inJ. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment, " 99 Yale L J 251 (1989). Compare Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two
Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 Tex L Rev 1265 (1988) (similar approach); Matthew W.
Finkin, On "'Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 Tex L Rev 817 (1983); William W. Van Alstyne, The
Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberties, 404 Annals Am Acad Pol Soc Sci
140 (November 1972).
56. See David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom
Under the First Amendment, 53 L & Contemp Probs 227 (Summer 1990); William W. Van Alstyne,
Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of The United States: An Unhurried Review, 53
L & Contemp Probs 79 (Summer 1990).
57. 354 US 236, 263 (1957).
58. Id (emphasis added).
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Other pronouncements by members of the Court similarly, deal with
institutional freedom rather than that of individuals. 59
Two lower-court decisions do bring the first amendment into the
classroom. One, Cooper v. Ross, 60 is quite remarkable. Judge Heaney of the
Eighth Circuit, sitting as a district judge, found that the plaintiff had been
denied reappointment at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock because he
had made known in his classes and elsewhere that he was a communist, a
member of the Progressive Labor party. These disclosures had inflamed
many members of the legislature. Apparently without any difficulty, Judge
Heaney wrote,
[iun summary, the Court concludes that Cooper's membership in the PLP and his
public acknowledgement of his beliefs, both inside and outside the University
classroom, were protected conduct under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court finds that this protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the
University's decision not to reappoint Cooper.6 1
Another decision encouraging the view that courts will protect the
academic freedom of the untenured is Dube v. State University of New York. 62 In
this recent case, the Second Circuit held that Professor Ernest Dube was
entitled to a trial on his allegations that the State University of New York
denied him tenure in retaliation against what some perceived to be his
suggestions (made in a seminar) that there are racist strains in Zionism.
Dube's alleged heresies aroused the ire of many Jewish persons and groups,
with Governor Mario Cuomo joining in a sharp expression of concern. 63 The
court agreed that Dube's first amendment rights might have been impaired. 64
This case was complicated by issues of qualified immunity of state officials,
who by virtue of the eleventh amendment enjoy considerable protection
against suit. These issues led the other two members of the panel to write
separate concurring opinions, 65 but were apparently not even raised in Cooper.
59. Consider especially the slighting reference by Justice Blackmun (writing for a unanimous
Court) to "the so-called academic freedom cases." University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577,
586 (1990). This case denied any academic freedom privilege for the University to protect peer
review materials from disclosure to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of a
plaintiff claiming race and sex discrimination. However, the Court went on to say, "Fortunately, we
need not define today the precise contours of any academic freedom right against government
attempts to influence the content of academic speech . . ." . Id. A footnote went farther:
Obvious First Amendment problems would arise where government attempts to direct the
content of speech at private universities. Such content-based regulation of private speech
traditionally has carried with it a heavy burden of justification. Where, as was the situation
in the academic-freedom cases, government attempts to direct the content of speech at
public educational institutions, complicated First Amendment issues are presented because
government is simultaneously both speaker and regulator.
Id at 587 n10 (citations omitted).
60. 472 F Supp 802 (ED Ark 1979).
61. Id at 814.
62. 900 F2d 587 (2d Cir 1990).
63. Id at 590.
64. Id at 597.
65. Id at 600 (Miner concurring; Mahoney generally concurring).
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It would take this article far afield if it did any more than to note their
existence. 66
Thus, we find some support for faculty members in these two instances of
alleged or actual invasions of academic freedom in the classroom. Similarly,
university professors have fared well when subjected to discipline for critical
statements directed at colleagues or administrators. 67
The constitutional standards that apply here come from a quartet of
Supreme Court decisions that focus not on the academy, but on general
standards of critical speech by public employees. In two of the four cases,
teachers were plaintiffs. The wellspring of this little fountain of constitutional
law is Pickering v. Board of Education,68 which held, with respect to a high school
teacher who wrote a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the handling of a
bond issue for new schools, that the Board of Education could not fire him
unless his critical statements were knowingly or recklessly false, which the
Court said they were not.69 The Court did, however, recognize an "interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." 70 A balance had to be struck. That balance
was tilted somewhat against the employee fifteen years later in Connich v.
Myers,7' where an assistant district attorney was fired for distributing a slanted
"questionnaire" to her colleagues. The Court found that "Myers'
questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited
sense." 72  It could be "most accurately characterized as an employee
grievance concerning internal office policy." 73  The balance tilted again
toward the employee in the bizarre case of Rankin v. McPherson.74 Rankin
concerned an incautious remark by a clerk in a county constable's office,
following the 1981 attempt to assassinate President Reagan: "If they go for
him again, I hope they get him."' 75 The Court held this statement not to
warrant her dismissal. 76 (Both Connick and McPherson were 5-4 decisions.)
The fourth player in the quartet of Supreme Court decisions is Mt. Healthy
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle. 77 In that case, the Court held that
66. Summarily, the officials would have qualified immunity from damages if their conduct did
not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Id at 596, quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982). But, Judge Meskill
wrote, the conduct alleged, if established at trial, would violate "long-standing and clearly
established First Amendment law." Id at 597. Dube, however, showed no 14th amendment due
process violations, because Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 (1972), controlled. 900 F2d at 599.
67. See notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
68. 391 US 563 (1968).
69. Id at 574. The Pickering court borrowed the "knowingly or recklessly false" yardstick as a
limit for protection of plaintiff's speech from New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) (the
famous case narrowing libel recovery by public officials).
70. 391 US at 568.
71. 461 US 138 (1983).
72. Id at 154.
73. Id.
74. 483 US 378 (1987).
75. Id at 380.
76. Id at 383.
77. 429 US 274 (1977).
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a school teacher who instigated over-the-air critical comments about the
school's principal could claim Pickering protection when he was not
reappointed. 78 The teacher would have the burden of showing that protected
speech was a "motivating" or "substantial" factor in the board's adverse
decision. 79 But then, the Court held unanimously, the board need only show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it had other adequate grounds for a
dismissal.8 0 On remand, the district court so found, and this outcome was
affirmed.8 l Mi. Healthy's reach is not confined to cases arising from critical
statements. Rather, Mt. Healthy's standard will surely be involved if the Dube
case goes to trial, because the announced ground for the denial of tenure was
Dube's very modest scholarly production.
The balancing act called for by Pickering, Connick, and Rankin has been
applied to the advantage of both tenured and nontenured professors. In Kurtz
v. Vickrey, 82 a tenured associate professor, whose carping clearly overtried the
patience of the defendant president, escaped summary judgment against him
because the reviewing court found some of his criticisms sufficiently related to
matters of public concern.8 3 The issue here was not dismissal; instead, it was
Kurtz's demand for promotion to the rank of professor.84 At trial, Kurtz
would still face the Mt. Healthy standard and the university's claim that his
scholarly activity was deficient.8 5
Even more remarkable was the application of Pickering in Johnson v. Lincoln
University8 6 to reverse a summary judgment and gain a judicial hearing for a
tenured faculty member who was dismissed on a variety of charges, some of
which the court found to stem from his criticisms on matters of public
concern. 7 The court found no want of due process in the internal removal.
It went straight to the first amendment challenges.88
Absent an unfavorable disposition in the Supreme Court that derails the
momentum in the courts of appeal, it appears that direct resort to the first
amendment in support of claims of denials of academic freedom8 9 has a
brightening future. Mt. Healthy, however, always casts an overhanging
shadow, for it practically invites censorious administrations to dredge up
78. Id at 284.
79. Id at 287.
80. Id.
81. Doyle v Mt. Healthy City School District, 670 F2d 59, 61 (6th Cir 1982), aff'g decision of US Dist
Ct (SD Ohio) after remand (unpubl opinion).
82. 855 F2d 723 (11 th Cir 1988).
83. Id at 733-34.
84. Id at 725.
85. Id at 734.
86. 776 F2d 443 (3d Cir 1985).
87. Id at 451-53.
88. Id at 449-50, 455. This was part of deep troubles at Lincoln that had supposedly been
resolved by a consent decree. Id at 448. See Trotman v Board of Trustees of Lincoln University, 635 F2d
216 (3d Cir 1980). See also D'Andrea v Adams, 626 F2d 469 (5th Cir 1980) (another successful
invocation of Pickering by a tenured faculty member).
89. The almost invariable jurisdictional basis for actions against state officials in any of the cases
discussed here is by way of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 USC § 1983; 28 USC §§ 1343(3), (4)
(1979).
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other deficiencies of a professor facing discipline, so as to be able to say, "We
would have fired her anyway." Indeed, a capable administrator, even though
bothered beyond endurance by a troublemaker, as in Kurtz, or buffeted by
outside powers, will try to avoid offering up the victim's head on a first
amendment platter. Such an administrator does not need the nudge of Mt.
Healthy to search for adequate independent grounds that will support adverse
action.
Now tenure does make a difference. The untenured faculty member, who
needs a hearing in order to challenge the adequacy of asserted grounds for
termination, will find that the Constitution does not entitle her to a hearing.
For that matter, she has no legal right to know why she is being fired. This
state of affairs is the result of the well-known 1972 decision of the Supreme
Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth.90 In Roth, Justice Stewart
pointed out that, to claim due process under the fourteenth amendment, Roth
had to have either a property interest or a liberty interest.9 1 As a term
appointee whose term had expired, he had neither. 92 The university need say
nothing; Roth's contract was at an end.93 Roth is usually bracketed with Perry
v. Sindermann,94 decided along with Roth, and pointedly connected for our
purpose. Sindermann claimed he had been let go because of his lawful
political activities. His college had no formal tenure system; but the Court, by
an indulgent interpretation of a pompously phrased but ambivalent college
statement on job security that could equally have been taken to negate tenure,
concluded that Sindermann must be given an opportunity to show that he had
acquired tenure in his ten years of teaching (albeit at three different
institutions) through an "unwritten 'common law'." 9 5
Both cases make it clear that the property or liberty entitlements that
would activate fourteenth amendment due process must ordinarily come from
outside the Constitution-from common law, contract, or statute. 96 This
proposition remains unchallenged. While the professor has the burden of
proving that he has tenure or its equivalent, once he has it, the core legal
meaning of tenure comes to bear: the burden of proof is then on the
institution to establish valid grounds for discipline. In any case, therefore,
90. 408 US 564 (1972).
91. Id at 570-71.
92. Id at 578.
93. Id.
94. 408 US 593 (1972).
95. 408 US at 602-03. Sindermann ultimately accepted a substantial settlement. The policy
statement read as follows:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College
wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching
services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-
workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.
Id at 600.
96. 408 US at 577. Commentary on Roth and Sindermann is extensive. See, for example, Peter N.
Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 Cal L Rev 146 (1983);
William W. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property ": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State,
62 Cornell L Rev 445 (1977).
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where the academic freedom elements are masked, ambiguous, or indirect,
tenure matters a great deal.
One can also boldly imagine a transformation of our legal system so that it
would offer comprehensive relief for persons deprived of their academic
freedom, relief free of such roadblocks as the necessity to show state action in
order to gain shelter under the Constitution. The state action requirement
effectively leaves unprotected teachers at private institutions, who still
represent one-fourth of the total scene.97
Such a transformation is not entirely imaginary. In the United Kingdom,
when a 1988 Act of Parliament set about to abolish tenure for the future,
outcries in defense of academic freedom were raised, especially in the House
of Lords. This far-reaching legislation included a stirring declaration that
directed the five university commissioners who would henceforth rule the
academic roost to "ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to
question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and
controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy
of losing their jobs or privileges that they may have at their institutions.- 98
Government ministers opposing this soothing generality argued that it
would not be "justiciable.-9 9 It is not beyond the capacity of the British
courts either to make the new charter toothsome or to render it toothless.
Such transatlantic surmise would be premature. In any case, for our Congress
and legislatures, a measure of this sort is at present beyond imagining.
Consequently, unless it is buttressed by tenure, the realm of law outside the
university provides an imperfect protection for academic freedom.' 00
B. Internal Tribunals
We next ask whether internal tribunals, if they afforded a full panoply of
due process guarantees, would or could provide justice for aggrieved
professors, without any system of tenure as we now know it. That such
tribunals might suffice has been suggested both by Dean Henry Rosovsky of
Harvard, a friend of tenure, and by President John Silber of Boston
University, assuredly not a friend of tenure.' 0 ' Neither they, nor any other
commentator we are aware of, has fleshed out this suggestion, which bristles
with both possibilities and problems.
97. Although there is no reason why state courts cannot serve the private sector by recognizing
academic freedom ights in state constitutions. These problems are succinctly addressed in Byrne, 99
Yale LJ at 299, 327 (cited in note 55).
98. Education Reform Act, Ch 40, § 202(2)(a) (1988).
99. See Ekkehard Kopp, Higher Education (Not Yet Post-Thatcher) in the United Kingdom, 74 Academe
67, 69 (September-October 1988). Attempts to end tenure in Australia and New Zealand have been
rebuffed. In Australia, there is currently a fitful move to enact an academic freedom statute
(conversations with Ann H. Franke, Esq., scholar in residence 1990-91 at Bond University, the first
private university in Australia).
100. We have perhaps failed to emphasize the uncertainties, and the attendant stress, expense,
and delay, that are built into the trial and appellate process.
101. Rosovsky's suggestion is at the end of a footnote to his supportive discussion of tenure.
Rosovsky, The University at 181 n7 (cited in note 20). Silber's comes from a journalist's survey.
Scully, Attacks on Tenure Mount at 1, 4 (cited in note 15).
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First, what would be the structure of academic appointments? Would they
be for one-year terms only? State law nominally compels annual contracts at
many public institutions, but such institutions have the backup of tenure and
often of de facto multiyear term appointments for probationers.
Try another no-tenure scenario. Assume that all appointments were
indefinite in duration, and went on year-to-year unless terminated. Could
they be terminated at the employer's will, except when the teacher prevailed
on a claim of infringement of academic freedom (or, though it is not our
topic, of unlawful discrimination)? Employment at will is no longer tolerable
in large sectors of the labor market; we doubt that most players in the
academic marketplace would accept a regime that gave no job security except
for a one-year period. That regime is what teachers off the tenure track
endure now, to scarcely anyone's satisfaction.
In a due process, no-tenure world, the missing element is not procedural
due process but the substance on which it would act in a disputed dismissal. If
something resembling adequate cause is the basis for termination, we quickly
arrive at the critical question: does the employer have the burden of
establishing adequate cause, whatever its content, or must the imperilled
teacher establish its absence? If the former, we are back to the key element of
a tenure status! And, what is probably not desired by those who want to
substitute internal due process for tenure, the burden on the administration
to demonstrate cause would also protect those who are now considered
probationers, unless we re-created that lower status as well.
If a threatened teacher has the burden of proving that her performance
met prevailing standards, would the injection of an academic freedom issue
then shift the burden again as to that issue? Could the teacher simply assert a
violation, or would she first have to establish a prima facie case? That is what
AAUP standards now require a nontenured faculty member to do if she is not
reappointed and alleges that the decision was based on considerations that
violate her academic freedom.10 2
There simply is no direct experience, and too little comparable
experience, to reach any comfortable prediction about the adequacy of a due-
process-only regime. Evergreen State College and Hampshire College, two
small progressive colleges, have experimented with a system of no tenure,
coupled with intricate due process protections in academic freedom cases.
These colleges have not, so far as we know, had occasion to process a case all
the way through their complicated procedures.
Richard Chait and Andrew Ford, who paid close attention to Evergreen
and Hampshire in their 1982 study, asserted that "the fact remains that
102. Although Regulation 10 of the AAUP Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic
Freedom and Tenure does not so specify, it is presumably the hearing committee that decides
whether a prima facie case has been made. AAUP, Recommended Institutional Regulations, in 1990 AAUP
Red Book at 21, 28 (cited in note 1I) ("RIR"). Once that crevasse is bridged, the administration must
then "come forward with evidence in support of [its] decision." Id. But the burden of proof still
"rest[s] upon the faculty member." Id.
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academic freedom can survive apart from tenure and together with term
contracts."' 0 3 No doubt it can survive, with high-minded people in charge,
but will it survive when exposed to less tender mercies? The central difficulty
lies in the expectable failure of academic freedom issues to present
themselves with their prima facie dress already properly adjusted. The real
world is filled rather with ambiguity, rationalization, and subterfuge.
Ambiguity: was the nonrentention of Professor X, who believes that the
Holocaust never happened, really a case of academic freedom at all?
Rationalization: his bizarre views aside, Professor X is in fact not a good
teacher. Subterfuge: Professor X's views are causing alumni to stop
contributing, but we don't have to say so; we can devise another reason for
nonretention.
This large gray area is what causes the writers to want to know more about
the context of employment security in which an internal due process model
would operate, if such a system's guarantees were confined to academic
freedom cases.
C. "Term Tenure" and "Interruptible Tenure"
The third and fourth alternatives to tenure are schemes for what may be
called "term tenure" or "interruptible tenure." By "term tenure," we mean
the substitution of a series of fairly long term appointments-say five or seven
years-with no assurance of continuation; "tenure" is here misapplied,
because one would have the protections of tenure only during a given term.
Term tenure surely takes its place among the oxymora that confuse thought.
Tenure means indefinite employment terminable only for cause (or for certain
specified constraints such as financial exigency). Term tenure is not tenure,
and does little to protect academic freedom. Moreover, reappointment
decision-making under term tenure is burdensome, a failing shared by
interruptible tenure.
By "interruptible" tenure we mean a system that purports to confer
tenure, and then, at intervals of five or possibly ten years, conducts a periodic
review of the tenured professor's performance. If the outcome of this review
is unsatisfactory, it can result in dismissal. Periodic reviews of varying
intensity are a frequently prescribed nostrum for the deficiencies of the
professoriate.10 4 Most such proposals are put forward as tools for faculty
development. If they are routinely required, they generate a great deal of
paperwork and take up a great deal of time and energy for the colleagues,
chairs, deans, and provosts who must do the reviewing.' 0 5 The benefits are
uncertain enough that the idea has not widely taken hold.
103. Richard P. Chait & Andrew T. Ford, Beyond Traditional Tenure 58 (Jossey-Bass, 1982).
104. For example, Martin Bronfenbrenner, Toward Compromise on Tenure, 5 Atlantic Econ J 22
(March 1977); Ernst Mayr, Tenure: A Sacred Cow?, 199 Science 1293 (March 1978).
105. Committee A has reported that:
The University of Colorado initiated a systematic program of post-tenure review [in 1983],
and a thorough study of the fruits of that program-apparently the first such study-was
undertaken and published in 1989. The study, prepared by Associate Vice President for
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By way of contrast, in the Wingspread Conference on Evaluation of
Tenured Faculty in 1983, the participants (who included the present writers
and a substantial number of senior university officers) delineated with
approval the manifold formal and informal evaluations that take place all the
time. 10 6 Going far beyond these models are suggestions that performance
reviews may lead to termination. The 1983 Conference consensus statement
deprecated the use of either systematic or informal evaluations as a ground
for dismissal: "Where grounds for dismissal are believed to exist, informal
resolutions of the problem should be pursued first. If these fail, then existing
due process procedures can be employed."' 0 7
In the keynote address for that conference, Harold Shapiro, then president
of the University of Michigan and later of Princeton, offered a concise and
eloquent appraisal of tenure. While cautiously endorsing "periodic
evaluation of tenured faculty [as] simply good personnel policy,"' 0 8 he warns
that
we should disconnect such ongoing periodic evaluations from the question of tenure
itself. Any attempt to link the issue of tenure and periodic evaluation of tenured
faculty, no matter how well-meaning, is, in my judgment, unlikely to strengthen our
institutions .... To the extent that the present tenure system serves society well, it
does so independent of periodic evaluation. To the extent that the present system
does not serve society well, a system of periodic posttenure evaluation linked to tenure
itself will not rectify the situation.
10 9
We will conclude this survey of alternatives to tenure with the
"confession" of the authors of Beyond Traditional Tenure, the most extensive
survey of the subject (although it does not include judicial protections). Chait
and Ford wrote:
When we first decided to examine alternatives to traditional tenure policies, we
assumed, at least tacitly, that we would discover one or several alternatives superior to
tenure. We had heard too many criticisms of tenure and read too many indictments to
believe that there were not more attractive alternatives. We would discover, analyze,
and report these options; as a result, some colleges would abandon tenure. In turn,
we would win a niche in academe as dragon slayers.
We were mistaken. The more we examined the alternatives, the less we were
persuaded that any were markedly superior to tenure or irresistibly attractive. Instead,
we reached essentially the same conclusion as the Keast Commission: effectively
administered by a campus community, academic tenure can be an effective policy. I °
Academic Affairs Marianne Wesson and Director of Policy and Planning Sandra Johnson,
supports the conclusion that the benefits to be gained from such review are modest or
speculative while the costs, principally consumption of time, are substantial and
demonstrable.
Report of Committee A, 76 Academe 32, 38 (September-October 1990).
106. Statement of the Wingspread Conference on Evaluation of Tenured Faculty, 69 Academe 14a
(November-December 1983).
107. Id.
108. Harry Shapiro, The Privilege and the Responsibility: Some Reflections on the Nature, Function, and
Future of Academic Tenure, in Report on Periodic Evaluation of Tenured Faculty: A Discussion at 'ingspread:
August 24-26, 1983, 69 Academe la, 3a, 7a (November-December 1983).
109. Id.
110. Chait & Ford, Beyond Traditional Tenure at 143 (cited in note 103).
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VI
LEAKS IN THE DIKE: WEAKNESSES IN THE SAFEGUARD OF TENURE
Before turning to the problems of the untenured, we conclude this
segment of our examination of tenure and academic freedom by looking at
four characteristics of the system that may weaken it. These characteristics
are, first, the adequacy of due process for professors threatened with
dismissal; second, the possible abuse of financial exigency as a ground for
termination; third, the risk that program changes will be used as a ground for
termination; and, fourth, the concern that the end of mandatory retirement
will somehow make tenure insupportable.
The suggestion that it might be too easy to fire a tenured professor would
surely provoke nothing but derision among most administrators. Just the
opposite view is imbedded in the conventional wisdom of academe. But firing
a tenured professor is possible; it happens several times each year." I It is
meant to be difficult; otherwise the high threshold of adequate cause, and the
allocation of the burden of proof to those who bring charges, would not have
been called into being.
There is no way of knowing how many tenured faculty members, faced
with implicit or explicit threats of dismissal for cause, simply go away quietly.
As in the outside world, they take early retirement; they leave "to pursue
other interests"; they are handed on to a less demanding institution. There
are also stratagems of varying legitimacy. Departure may be purchaseable;
poor working conditions, such as unwanted teaching assignments or cramped
research space, can be pushed from the unpleasant to the intolerable.
Ostracism by one's colleagues is not unheard of.
The disputed cases that attract attention, either through the press,
through condemnation by means of an AAUP censure, or through a
professor's resort to the courts, seem to fall loosely into three categories. In
the first category are genuine invasions of freedom to teach or publish.
These, we believe, would usually be exposed and repudiated by a fair hearing.
They come most often to the AAUP's attention from institutions that neither
recognize tenure nor afford fair procedures.' 12 The second category involves
situations where there is a genuine difference of opinion whether the conduct
charged deserves dismissal. Presumably, the professors who went to the
11. For an instructive example of a hard-fought case in which the former chair of the
Department of Afro-American and African Studies was dismissed on wide-ranging charges of
incompetent performance, see King v University of Minnesota, 774 F2d 224 (8th Cir 1985). See also
Mueller v Regents of the University of Minnesota, 855 F2d 555, 558 (8th Cir 1988) (dismissal for alleged
"misuse of the university personnel, name and resources"). Contrast with Mueller, San Filippo v
Bongiovanni, 743 F Supp 327, 328 (D NJ 1990), in which the judge lamented that "[it is a disgrace
that Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, cannot terminate a faculty member when he or she
has committed ethical violations of a high order because, for whatever reason, Rutgers has not seen
fit to adopt regulations which would permit it to do so."
112. See, for example, the AAUP's case report, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Northern State College
(South Dakota), 54 AAUP Bull 306 (1968), and its supplementary report on the University of Northern
Colorado, University of Northern Colorado: A Supplementary Report on a Censured Administration, 71
Academe 2a (November-December 1985).
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courts of appeal to challenge their dismissals for homosexual relations with
students did not think themselves guilty of grave misconduct." 13 At another
extreme, church-related institutions that dismiss dissidents do not believe that
they are improperly limiting academic freedom (or in some cases simply do
not claim to provide academic freedom)." 4 The third category of challenges
to the system comes from troublemakers. They may be voices crying in the
wilderness; they may be intolerable boors.' 1 5 Simple incapacity to perform
effectively rarely surfaces.
The dedication to judgment by one's peers, that is by one's colleagues, on
which the AAUP is insistent, may pose a special problem that is rather likely to
crop up in the third category: that of the obnoxious colleague. A tribunal of
peers might be expected to stand up against the administration; but suppose
the demand for removal came from other peers? The AAUP Recommended
Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, first
promulgated in 1957 and frequently revised, assign a primary role to a faculty
hearing committee, while recognizing the ultimate authority of the governing
board. The only provision they make for impaired objectivity is to prescribe
that "members deeming themselves disqualified for bias or interest will
remove themselves from the case, either at the request of a party or on their
own initiative. Each party will have a maximum of two challenges without
stated cause."" t6 The Recommended Institutional Regulations do not deal
with the possibility that a case may so deeply divide a faculty (especially in a
small institution) that an open-minded committee cannot be found. In a few
instances where such an impasse existed, assistance was solicited from
colleagues in neighboring institutions. The governing board should be in a
position to review a claim of pervasive bias-unless the board also is steeped
in the imbroglio." 17
Tenured professors faced with dismissal generally receive due process
nowadays.' 18 To be sure, if the system is put under severe stress by a war or a
113. See Korf v Ball State University, 726 F2d 1222 (7th Cir 1984); Corstvet v Boger, 757 F2d 223
(10th Cir 1985).
114. See notes 25-26.
115. See Huang v Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, 902 F2d 1134 (4th Cir 1990)
(involuntary transfer out of department, on unanimous recommendation of 23 colleagues, upheld).
116. RIR § 5(c), at 26 (cited in note 102).
117. Another way out is to submit the case to arbitration, as would be commonplace under
collective bargaining. There are unresolved tensions within the AAUP over the appropriate spheres
of peer adjudication and outside arbitration. See 76 Academe 37 (cited in note 105).
118. One shortcoming may be in the handling of sexual harassment cases. A paper presented at
the 1990 AAUP Annual Meeting, characterized as a "vulnerable" area of tenure protection,
[t]he quiet, quick way that tenured professors facing sexual harassment charges are being
pressured to resign without formal review or due process. Frequently such cases are
handled by the affirmative action officer and never receive formal review through faculty
governance procedures. If guilty, the professor is allowed to leave without exposure,
perhaps to repeat such conduct elsewhere, and without any redress to injured parties. If not
guilty, the costs of fighting such charges-financially, professionally, and personally-may
be too high to pay. AAUP officials report that sexual harassment is now the most frequent
cause of stripping tenure. The absence of due process in these cases should alarm all
faculty.
Linda Ray Pratt, Changes in the Tenure System: A Twenty Year Overview, 10 Footnotes 4 (Fall 1990).
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demagogue, fissures will develop; moreover, due process is costly for both
sides. However, an administration faced with an obdurate miscreant will
prevail if it will bear the costs; and the dismissal will be upheld in the courts.
Does financial exigency lead to a leak in the dike? The recognized
legitimacy of letting go even tenured faculty if finances are sufficiently
desperate surely impairs the security of tenure. Whether such dismissals have
any adverse implications for academic freedom is a function of fairness in
administering the layoffs. The AAUP's policies on financial exigency, as
usual, trust in heavy faculty participation in the process.
In the decision to declare a condition of exigency and, closer to the
concerns of this paper, in the identification of those who must go, the
Recommended Institutional Regulations give a faculty member marked for
termination "the right to a full hearing before a faculty committee.""19 In
that hearing, a faculty member can raise, along with other considerations,
"[w]hether the criteria are being properly applied in the individual case."120
This would appear to provide an appropriate forum in which to claim that
academic freedom violations lay behind that individual's release.
There have been a substantial number of financial exigency episodes in the
last twenty years, and there will doubtless be more. Where controversies have
gone to litigation, the predominant issue has been whether the declaration of
financial exigency was, in the words of the 1940 Statement, "demonstrably
bona fide." 2' The AAUP is exceedingly cautious in recognizing financial
exigency; nothing less than "an imminent financial crisis which threatens the
survival of the institution as a whole and which cannot be alleviated by less
drastic means"' 122 will justify terminations of tenured faculty, or of others
during a stated term. The courts have been more indulgent in accepting
institutional claims of exigency.' 23 Thus, defining exigency is where the
action has been.
In a few cases, faculty members marked for dismissal have complained that
they were selected for improper reasons. In one such case, a North Dakota
jury awarded damages to a dismissed faculty member, apparently persuaded
that his "squabbles with the administration" led to his nonrenewal, rather
than financial exigency, which was very likely genuine. 124 Other cases have
made it fairly clear that a faculty member is entitled to a hearing when
asserting that his or her layoff was based on improper reasons-although the
119. RIR § 4 (c)(2), at 24 (cited in note 102).
120. Id.
121. 1940 Statement at 4; Appendix B at 409 (cited in note 9).
122. RIR § 4(c)(1), at 23 (cited in note 102).
123. See generally Robert C. Ludolph, Termination of Faculty Tenure Rights Due to Financial Exigency
and Program Discontinuance, 63 U Det L Rev 609, 610 nl (1986), citing other extensive "recent
commentary". See also Ralph S. Brown, Financial Exigency, 62 AAUP Bull 5 (Spring 1976); David
Fellman, The Association's Evolving Policy on Financial Exigency, 70 Academe 14 (May-June 1984).
124. Vallejo vJamestown College, 294 NW2d 753 (ND 1976) (separation was through nonrenewal of
annual contract; nothing was said about tenure).
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hearing need not have all the refinements of a full-blown dismissal
proceeding. 12
5
Discontinuing a department or a program of instruction is another
accepted ground for terminating tenured appointments-accepted by the
AAUP, that is, under strict guidelines. These guidelines insist that the action
be based "essentially upon educational considerations" and that "every
effort" be made to relocate such displaced persons within the institution.
Again, a full hearing is called for,' 26 one function of which must be to guard
against the intrusion of improper considerations. Discontinuing an entire
program would seem to appear neutral in application. But the department or
program may be a small one, and all of its tenured members may be non grata.
The leading case defining what a "program" is arose from the dismissal of
only one tenured faculty member. 127 Financial exigency had also been
stipulated. Judge Skelly Wright, in an opinion that paid considerate attention
to AAUP norms, recognized that "[flinancial exigency can become too easy an
excuse for dismissing a teacher who is merely unpopular or controversial or
misunderstood . . . without according him his important procedural
rights."128
The most potent recent threat to the integrity of tenure arises from the
prospective end of mandatory retirement for tenured professors. When
retirement for age was generally abolished in 1986,129 an exception was made
for "any employee who has attained 70 years of age, and who is serving under
a contract of unlimited tenure."' 30 This exception is due to expire on
December 31, 1993.131 On that date, unless the exception is extended, which
seems unlikely, tenured faculty will be treated like everyone else, and may not
be required to retire on account of age. Of course, faculty members could
still under the law be discharged or disciplined "for good cause."' 3 2
Impending expiration of the age discrimination exception for professors
led to rather hasty (and usually private) predictions by senior administrators,
like one reported to this writer, that "tenure as we know it cannot survive the
ending of retirement for age." Why should this be so? Because, it was
believed, faculty members would linger on until death or physical disability
125. RIR § 4(c)(2), at 24 (cited in note 102). The cases include Aabey v Reagan, 537 F2d 1036
(9th Cir 1976); Bignall v North Idaho College, 538 F2d 243 (9th Cir 1976); see Ludolph, 63 U Det L Rev
at 620-26 (cited in note 123).
A significant recent case is Johnston-Taylor v Gannon, 907 F2d 1577 (6th Cir 1990). Two professors
selected for dismissal in an alleged financial exigency complained that the procedures of a collective
bargaining agreement were inadequate. One had tenure; one was on a "continuing appointment,"
which the court treated as equivalent to tenure, so that both could invoke constitutional due process
under Perry, 408 US 593, and were entitled to a proper hearing.
126. RIR § 4(d), at 24-25 (cited in note 102).
127. Browzin v Catholic University of America, 527 F2d 843 (DC Cir 1975).
128. Id at 847.
129. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub L No 99-592, 100 Stat
3342; 29 USC § 621 (1988).
130. 29 USC § 631(d) (from 1989 amendment) (1988, Supp 1990).
131. Pub L No 99-592 §§ 2(c), 6(b).
132. 29 USC § 623(0(3).
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forced them out, thus lowering the quality of teaching and frustrating the
prospects of recruitment and promotion for younger scholars. 33
Such concerns were given temperate consideration by Oscar Ruebhausen,
the distinguished lawyer who chaired the Commission on College Retirement
that produced a very useful report in 1986.'34 Ruebhausen (independently of
the commission) pointed out correctly that retirement upon reaching a certain
age had long been the expectation-rarely challenged-in higher education.
Believing that universities should have some flexibility in dealing with aged
faculty, he proposed that professors, on accepting tenure, should also accept a
long-term contract, possibly lasting thirty-five years. On its expiration, tenure
would end, and any longer retention would be the subject of new contracts. 3 5
The feasibility and legality of Ruebausen's proposals were rebutted by
Professor Finkin.13 6 We are not aware of any initiative to implement them.
We have outlined them as an example of a cautious reaction to sometimes
incautious alarms.
No one will be able to assert with assurance, until some time after 1993,
whether the alarms have been well founded. Two substantial studies attempt
to explore the future. One, mandated by Congress, 37 is being carried out by
the National Academy of Sciences, and is still in process. The other, financed
by foundations, was performed at Princeton University under the direction of
Professor Albert Rees. It is awaiting publication. 13
Rees' study, which focused on the arts and sciences faculties of doctoral
degree-granting institutions and selective liberal arts colleges, states as its
principal conclusion that "statements of alarm and concern have surprisingly
little basis in fact, and are considerably overblown."' 3 9 The project did not
have to rely on predictions. In several states, mandatory retirement,
especially in public institutions, has been "uncapped" for several years. The
Project found "no significant differences in mean retirement age between
capped and uncapped public universities or capped and uncapped liberal arts
colleges."140 We do not think it appropriate to divulge more fully the findings
of a study that, as we write, is still unpublished. But we think that it will dispel
133. See generally Martin L. Levine, Age Discrimination and the Mandatory Retirement Controversy
(johns Hopkins Univ Press, 1988); Karen Holden & W. Lee Hansen, eds, The End of Mandatory
Retirement: Effects on Higher Education (Jossey-Bass, 1989); Report, Ending Mandatory Retirement in Higher
Education, 76 Academe 52 (January-February 1990).
134. Commission on College Retirement, A Pension Program for College and University Personnel, in
Oscar M. Ruebhausen, ed, Pension and Retirement Policies in Colleges and Universities; An Analysis and
Recommendations (Jossey-Bass, 1990).
135. Oscar M. Ruebhausen, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986:
Implications for Tenure and Retirement, 14 J Col & Univ L 561 (1988).
136. Matthew W. Finkin, Tenure After an Uncapped ADEA: A Different View, 15 J Col & Univ L 43
(1988).
137. 29 USC § 622(a).
138. Albert Rees & Sharon P. Smith, Faculty Retirement in the Arts and Sciences (Princeton Univ Press,
forthcoming 1991).
139. Id at ch 6 (conclusions).
140. Id.
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any notion that the end of mandatory retirement will place tenure under
substantial stress.
In sum, there are no major leaks in the dike. Tenure, always under attack,
seems to be generally secure.
VII
ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR ACADEMICS WHO Do NOT HAVE TENURE
If, as this article has reaffirmed, academic tenure serves substantially to
protect academic freedom, we still must consider, albeit briefly, what protects
the academic freedom of the significant minority of teachers and researchers
who have not yet attained tenure or who have been kept outside the tenure
system.
The 1940 Statement asserts that "during the probationary period a
teacher should have the academic freedom that all other members of the
faculty have,"' 41 and the AAUP asserts in its Recommended Institutional
Regulations that "[a]ll members of the faculty, whether tenured or not, are
entitled to academic freedom."' 142 Merely setting forth these assertions does
not, however, ensure academic freedom for faculty members who are subject
to nonreappointment at an administration's pleasure, and one can fairly
wonder whether, if tenure is vital for academic freedom, it is only the tenured
whose academic freedom is truly protected. 143
Our experience shows that there is some truth, as well as considerable
paternalism, in the statement that the best protection for the academic
freedom of the nontenured is a strong tenured faculty. Administrators with a
strong devotion to academic freedom have on occasion provided this
protection too-sometimes, as AAUP's Alexander Meiklejohn Awards have
testified, with commendable courage. 144 The hope of protection from above,
however, is no substitute for specific procedural safeguards. The need for the
latter became manifest during the McCarthy era, when the number of tenured
professors dismissed in disregard of principles of academic freedom was
relatively small compared with the hundreds of politically suspect faculty
members serving on term appointments that were not renewed. These faculty
members were afforded no opportunity to contest the action.145 The AAUP
responded to this situation in its 1956 report on Academic Freedom and
Tenure in the Quest for National Security, calling for a faculty review
procedure in a case of nonreappointment on grounds that allegedly violate
academic freedom, with a full adjudicative hearing to occur upon
141. 1940 Statement at 4, Appendix B at 408 (cited in note 9).
142. RIR § 9(a), at 28 (cited in note 102).
143. See Van Alstyne, 57 AAUP Bull at 331-33 (cited in note 2).
144. The Alexander Meiklejohn Award is presented to an American college or university
administrator or trustee in recognition of an outstanding contribution to academic freedom. See, for
example, The Seventeenth Alexander Meiklejohn Award, 74 Academe 42 (September-October 1988).
145. Lionel S. Lewis, Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control 29-47
(Transaction Books, 1988).
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establishment of a prima facie case.' 46 This recommended procedural
safeguard for nontenured faculty was adopted by a wide segment of the
academic community within a few years. So, in the next decade, was the
AAUP's 1964 Standards for Notice of Nonreappointment, calling for notice
by March 1 in the first year of appointment, by December 15 in the second
year, and twelve months in advance thereafter. The deadlines for notice
provided affected faculty members with time to relocate, or to seek
reconsideration of a negative decision before their existing appointments
expired; along with other procedural developments discussed in Parts VII A-
C, they also contributed to a more orderly and equitable system of evaluation.
A. Obtaining Reasons for a Nonreappointment Decision and Opportunity
for Review of the Decision
The probationary faculty member who refused to testify before a
congressional committee about his political associations, and who the next
day was notified by his dean that he was not being reappointed, had a pretty
good idea of the reason for the decision. More often than not, however,
notice of nonreappointment unaccompanied by any explanation left the
faculty member unclear why the notice was issued. A person in this plight was
ill informed to determine whether and on what grounds to seek review of the
decision. A quarter of a century ago, relatively few institutions, and very few
prestigious universities and liberal arts colleges, had policies calling for the
issuance of reasons for nonreappointment. In 1964 the AAUP itself
published an advisory letter from its staff that cautioned against providing
reasons. The letter offered arguments that in retrospect seem embarrassingly
overprotective of those who make the decision (because they need "the
utmost latitude in determining who will be retained") and embarrassingly
paternalistic toward the junior faculty member who is left in the dark (in order
to spare upsetting the poor candidate by revealing reasons "that are either
very difficult to discuss frankly or which the faculty member cannot
appreciate"). 14 7
Increasing demand for openness in the decision-making process, and for
grievance procedures that would afford opportunity for review of allegedly
arbitrary and unfair decisions, led AAUP's Committee A into a two-year
examination that resulted in the Association's 1971 Statement on Procedural
Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments. 148 The
new procedural standards, after explaining the arguments for and against
providing reasons for nonreappointment, came down clearly in favor of
providing reasons when the faculty member so requests. Upon such request,
the standards called for an oral explanation of the decision against
reappointment and then, upon further request, for a written statement of the
reasons. The standard extended the right of review to an allegation of
146. Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security, 42 AAUP Bull 61 (1956).
147. Letter Number Thirteen, 50 AAUP Bull 85 (1964).
148. 1990 AAUP Red Book at 15 (cited in note 11).
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inadequate consideration in the decision-making process, rather than limiting
appeals to decisions allegedly based on impermissible factors, and thus
violative of academic freedom. The procedures thereby afforded access to a
faculty grievance committee which, if it found merit in the allegation, could
remand the matter to the decision-making body for its further consideration.
The 1971 procedural standards had just been published when the case of
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth came before the Supreme Court. 49 The
AAUP, in a brief amicus curiae, supported the contention of Professor Roth, a
nontenured faculty member in the Wisconsin State University system who was
challenging nonreappointment, that he was entitled under the fourteenth
amendment to due process. The AAUP's brief, citing the procedural
standards extensively, argued for "minimal due process, as exemplified by a
statement of reasons and a limited hearing."' 5 0 As we have observed
earlier,' 5 ' the Court, holding that Roth had not been deprived of liberty or
property, rejected his constitutional claim. It noted, however, that its analysis
of Roth's rights under the Constitution did not speak to whether it is
"appropriate or wise in public colleges and universities" to afford
"opportunity for a hearing or a statement of reasons for nonretention," citing
AAUP's procedural standards to illustrate what might be afforded.' 5 2
Even though, after Roth, reasons and opportunity for review are not
constitutionally required, and though many university attorneys argue that it
is safer to give no reasons than to give and then have to defend them, policies
calling for reasons and review have become quite common. What was the
exception twenty-five years ago now seems to be pretty much the rule.'15
B. Access to Faculty Personnel Records in Contesting Nonreappointment
Access to personnel records -is an important remaining issue, and not only
in the sense that is has not yet been discussed in this paper. Key elements of
this issue that bear on procedural safeguards for nontenured faculty members
remain to be resolved in the academic community. Colleges and universities
traditionally have been left largely to themselves, with practices varying
widely, in determining which records are closed and which are open, both to
the subject faculty member and to others. The issue became one of sharp
concern over the past decade, in the context ofjudicially compelled disclosure
149. 408 US 564 (1972).
150. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth 10-14 (No 71-162)
(January 1972).
151. See notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
152. 408 US at 578-79. See also William W. Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured,
58 AAUP Bull 267-70 (1972).
153. An additional salutary development in procedures for review available to nontenured faculty
members involves protections against improper discrimination. AAUP's Recommended Institutional
Regulations and its procedural standards as now revised, have come to specify a complaint of
discrimination in nonreapointment, as well as a complaint of violation of academic freedom, as
potentially involving impermissible actions that warrant adjudication through a full hearing of record
if a prima facie case is established. Moreover, statistical evidence of improper discrimination can be
used in establishing the case. RIR at 28 (cited in note 102).
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in the processing of discrimination complaints. 54  Markedly different
conclusions of law from different federal appellate courts were resolved
earlier in 1990 when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, unequivocally rejecting any claim of
privilege from disclosure. 55 Henceforth, we can presume, a faculty plaintiff
who is litigating under federal antidiscrimination law will have access to all
documentation in her or his files, and in others' files as well, that arguably
relates to the plaintiff's complaint.
Thus, the law is clear regarding judicial or administrative proceedings
pursuant to discrimination complaints; but what of internal appeals of
decisions to deny reappointment? An AAUP subcommittee has concluded,
with respect to complaints involving a claim of violation of academic freedom
or of antidiscrimination policy, that the faculty review committee should be
granted access to relevant documentation in the files of the complainant and
of others, and should have the discretion to share it with the complainant
under certain circumstances. Whether and how these circumstances should
be specified is still being discussed, as is whether committees should have
access to relevant documentation in all cases in which a nonreappointment
decision is alleged to be unfair or irregular, or only those in which the faculty
member alleges violation of academic freedom or discrimination. Beyond
access to documentation, there is the question whether the faculty
complainant, at least when discrimination is alleged, should have the same
right of access (without depending on the faculty committee's discretion) that
a plaintiff now has in a judicial proceeding. This issue sharply divided the
AAUP's subcommittee in its initial report. These are but some of the
questions relating to access to personnel records that await resolution.
C. Delaying the Granting of Tenure by Lengthening the Probationary
Period
As emphasized earlier, the seven-year maximum set by the 1940 Statement
allows a probationary period that is quite long when measured against
apprenticeship periods common in other skilled professions and occupations.
Pressures to allow an even longer probation abound, however. These
pressures come from both faculty and administration (albeit usually for
different reasons) in the form of proposed changes in general policy and
proposed exceptions in individual cases. They come in a fairly steady stream
to the AAUP, especially when it is seen that AAUP-recommended standards
do not permit a particular lengthening that is sought. The AAUP's blessing
on a breach of its rules is solicited; the AAUP is then often cast as the villain
for not endorsing an arrangement the parties immediately involved consider
the best way to solve a problem.
154. For AAUP's position when the issue initially surfaced, see A Preliminary Statement on judicially
Compelled Disclosure in the Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 67 AAUP Bull 27, 28 (1981).
155. 110 S Ct 577 (1990).
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One device for lengthening the probationary period is to decline to grant
credit toward tenure for previous service at another institution; despite the
1940 Statement's requirement that at least three years of such service should
be credited. From the outset, some major universities, otherwise models in
terms of their general adherence to the 1940 Statement and its derivative
principles and standards, have simply declined to give probationary credit for
previous service elsewhere. As pressures to extend probationary time grew,
with numerous additional colleges and universities either refusing to continue
crediting previous service or calling upon the AAUP to reconsider the
requirement, the AAUP in 1978 adopted an interpretive statement. 156 This
statement acknowledges that it may be in the best interests of all parties to
determine at the time of initial appointment whether credit for prior service can be
waived, requiring a full seven-year probationary period at the current
institution. If certain conditions (including faculty approval of the policy)
prevail, the statement declares, the AAUP will not consider an agreement to
waive credit to be "a violation of principles of academic freedom and tenure
warranting an expression of Association concern." 157
A second device for allowing more probationary time has been to place
new faculty members who have not completed the terminal degree in a kind of
preprobationary status, with the probationary years commencing only after
the degree is obtained. This practice is also unacceptable under the 1940
Statement, which applies the probationary period to all full-time faculty
members regardless of academic rank and credentials. Some institutions
place a cap (usually two years) on the amount of full-time pre-Ph.D. service
that will be permitted, but others permit such service to go on and on; the
AAUP has reported on cases in which probationary time began to be counted
only after the faculty member's years of service had already exceeded the
seven years of probation that the 1940 Statement permits. 158 Interest in
allowing an extension of the probationary period for parents of young
children has gathered momentum in recent years and has been the subject of
considerable debate. Some major research universities have adopted policies
to that effect; others have rejected them. Most such policies that have been
considered would permit only one or two one-year extensions.
Pleas for extensions of probation to meet special needs in particular
academic fields have been too numerous and diverse to be listed here. One
prominent example is the person recruited to a medical school faculty to
perform simultaneously as researcher, teacher, and clinician. Meeting the
requirements for tenure within seven years in any one of these capacities is
difficult enough, so the persuasive argument for more probationary time goes,
but meeting them in all three capacities is well nigh impossible.
156. AAUP, On Crediting Prior Service Elsewhere as Part of the Probationary Period, in 1990 AA UP Red
Book at 69 (cited in note 11).
157. Id at 70.
158. See Pennsylvania State University: A Report on Two Cases of Excessive Probation, 72 Academe 15a-
19a (May-June 1986).
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If a university yields to the urging of its medical school and grants an
extension, it is likely to confront similar demands from, for example, its
business school, its school of social work, and its computer science
department. If extensions are granted to persons rearing children, it becomes
more difficult to refuse them to those who need to complete their doctoral
degrees or who are saddled with prior service elsewhere. The increase in
what one needs to do to prove oneself has indeed been explosive in some
academic fields, for there is always more to learn and to do. Extensions of the
stated maximum probationary period, if permitted for less than highly
extraordinary reasons, will tend to be granted with increasing frequency and
casualness. The resulting general erosion of the fixed probationary period
would undermine the system of academic tenure and weaken the safeguards it
provides for academic freedom.
D. Avoiding the Granting of Tenure by Keeping Faculty Members Out of
the Tenure System
The procedural safeguards developed and broadly accepted by the
academic community over the past fifty years, recounted in Parts VII A-C,
have done a good deal to buttress the 1940 Statement's assertion that
probationary faculty should have the same academic freedom as their tenured
colleagues. Most regrettably, however, increasing numbers of faculty
members are being excluded from the system of tenure and probation.
Neither tenured nor probationary, they serve with scant protection for their
academic freedom.
Under the AAUP's recommended standards, all full-time faculty
appointments are either probationary or with continuous tenure; exceptions
are limited to "special appointments clearly limited to a brief association with
the institution, and reappointments of retired faculty members on special
conditions."1 59 Many colleges and universities have treated teachers in
clinical programs or of elementary or remedial courses as holders of "special
appointments" outside the system of probation and tenure, even though the
courses may carry academic credit. The teacher's association with the
institution may be of brief duration, but it may just as likely continue
indefinitely through successive one-year (or even one-semester) appointments
renewable at the administration's pleasure. Often these appointments are
designated "temporary," although a faculty member may have served under
them for ten or twenty or more years. "Temporary" in such cases does not
mean what it is supposed to mean in the English language; it is twisted to
mean that the regular rules (such as standards for notice, obtaining reasons
for nonretention, and access to grievance procedures) do not apply. 60
159. RIR § 1(b) at 21 (cited in note 102).
160. Equally offensive to the English language and to concepts of fairness is the placement of a
faculty member on an appointment designated as "part-time," and paying dismally low per-course
wages, with teaching assignments that meet or even exceed what for more fortunate colleagues is a
full-time load. On the use and abuse of part-time appointments, see The Status of Part-Time Faculty, in
1990 AAUP Red Book at 52 (cited in note 11).
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Placing faculty members in this kind of inferior status because their
responsibilities are deemed insufficiently lofty to let them into the tenure
system is bad enough. Worse, as an abuse of principles of academic freedom
and tenure, is the placement on these nontenure-track appointments of
faculty members whose academic responsibilities are indistinguishable from
those of their probationary and tenured colleagues. Managerial concerns for
flexibility and economy lie behind these abuses but do not justify them. The
devices are academically unsound and plainly unfair. 161 Until the managers of
higher education bring into the tenure system the large numbers of our
colleagues who are being improperly kept out of it, academic freedom for
them will be poorly protected and for all will be less than secure.
VIII
CONCLUSION
Tenure, like any other large, occasionally inefficient system, will probably
remain under attack for years to come. Anecdotal evidence of inferior
scholars and teachers shielded by tenure makes a powerful hostile argument,
though not a valid one. The economic and social costs of the tenure system
are, we believe, outweighed by the fact that tenure is vital to academic
freedom. No other proposed alternative (such as legal defenses, internal
safeguards, less-than-career tenure, or tenure review) can provide adequate
protection to the academic community. A greater danger to the tenure system
than outright abrogation is continued circumvention. Deficiencies in the due
process accorded fired professors, dubious financial exigency claims by
colleges and universities, the discontinuation of entire programs, and,
especially, runaway expansion of nontenure-track positions threaten not to
tear down the tenure system, but to weaken it severely.
161. For a report on the range of problems arising from these practices (and their prevalence),
see On Full-Time Non Tenure-Track Appointments, in 1990 AAUP Red Book at 40 (cited in note 11).
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